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Jiirgen Habcrmas. Editor. Observations on "The Spiritual Situation 
of the Age" Contemporary German Perspectives. Translated and with 
an introduction by Andrew Buchwaiter. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1985. 
List of Contributors and General Index, pp.381. Reviewed by Martin J . 
Matustik, Ford ham University. 
The English translation of the two-volume collection of critical essays, 
Stickworle zur 'Geistigen Situation der Zeit,' contains fourteen out of thirty-
two contributions by contemporary German leftist intellectuals (selections 
for this translation were made by Andrew Buchwalter and Thomas 
McCarthy). Habcrmas conceived the project as volume 1,000 of the 
edition suhrkamp to be published in the year (1979) which commemorated 
the thirtieth anniversary of the Federal Republic of Germany. In soliciting 
essays, he provided Karl Jaspers' cultural criticism of late Weimar 
Germany, Die geistige Situation der Zeit, which appeared two years before 
Hitler's rise to power (1931), as a paradigm for the type of theoretical and 
practical diagnosis of the "present age" needed in the contemporary 
German republic (pp. 2-4). 
Nevertheless, there are three differences that distinguish Habermas' 
proposal from Jaspers' stand-point. The first two have to do with 
methodology, the latter is a normative issue. Habermas explains why the 
title, 'The Spiritual Situation of the Age', is to be put in quotation marks: 
First, while Jaspers adopted "the absolute perspective of the great 
philosopher," Habermas abandons Hegel's monological fusion of reason 
and history as a transcendental ground for grand philosophical theory and 
instead frames social criticism by empirical and hcrmeneutic parameters 
(pp. 2-4; xv). Secondly, it follows that critical evaluation of the present age 
cannot be accomplished by one individual but will call on the collaborative 
effort of enquirers and the use of communicative, dialogical reason. 
Thirdly, given the shift in focus from a Hegelian metaphysical mediation 
of history and the Zeitgeist to a mediation by a communicative rationality, 
the critical angle of the book is to differentiate between the pathologies 
and discontents of the present and the emancipatory potential of 
modernity. 
What underlies the methodological and normative concerns of the 
collection is Habermas' theory of communicative action. The selection of 
the contributors—all come from the undogmatic left and defend the 
project of modernity and the values of reason, democratic institutions and 
humanism—was not arbitrary. Habermas' edition of critical essays, drawn 
from a wide variety of authors, tests his theory in a concrete critical 
discourse of modernity. An immediate objection protests that Habermas' 
choice is totalitarian and excludes from the discourse those voices that 
want to unmask the exhaustion and failure of Enlightenment. The 
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objection might add that by selecting only those who defend modernity, 
Habermas' evaluation of the present age exemplifies what is worst in any 
defense of critical rationality: dominating and absolutizing logocentrism 
which cannot stand any difference, which is too serious and which 
crunches the playfulness of open discourse. 
While Habermas gives full attention to post-modern currents in his 
recent volume, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (Cambridge: 
the MIT Press, 1987), the present suhrkamp edition was intended to offset 
certain one-sided developments in the contemporary German thought 
and politics. The West German context parallels to some degree the 
contemporary European and American scene. On the one hand, there is 
the recent neoconservative shift to the New Right in the German 
intellectual and political milieu, e.g. the so-called Tendenzwende in the 
aftermath of the terrorist actions in the German Autumn of 1977. On the 
other hand, the authors of the present volume address theoretical and 
practical failures (among postmodern leftists and the New Right) to 
diagnose the pathologies of modernity with a view to possible cures (pp. 5, 
15). For Habermas, as in 1931 when Jaspers engaged in cultural criticism 
so also today, "the duty of the intellectuals |is| to react with partiality and 
objectivity, with sensitivity and incorruptibility, to movements, 
developmental tendencies, dangers, and critical moments. It is the task of 
intellectuals to make conscious a murky reality" (p. 3). 
Buchwalter's substantial introduction as well as the introductory essay 
by Habermas sum up the main themes developed in the present volume 
(pp. vii-xxxvii, 1-28). First, the theme of general anxiety and despair 
underlies the anti-nuclear and ecological movements as well as the loss of 
faith in democratic institutions and the economic future (essays by Wolf-
Dieter Narr, Claus Offe, and Ulrich Preuss in the first section, 
"Perspectives on Politics and Society," pp. 31-121). The Green party, that 
entered parliamentary politics in 1983, challenges the social contract of the 
post war German Republic. The Greens address equally the budgetary 
crisis of welfare-state capitalism and the values associated with 
materialism, acquisition and profit-oriented mentality. 
The second important theme vocalizes the rise of general 
surveillance, from the mid-70s to the present, by the state and police 
system in response to terrorism (e.g. Albert Wellmer, 'Terrorism and the 
Critique of Society," pp. 283-307). Further, under this theme authors 
evaluate how some changes in the German Criminal Code, which now 
anticipates anti-statist activities and civil disobedience, and in the Decree 
against Radicals, which requires all state employees to declare loyalty to 
the status quo values, are all signs of the legitimation crisis of the second 
Ccrman republic (the section, "Perspectives on German Affairs" contains 
essays by Hans Mommsen, Albrecht Wellmer and Horst Ehmke, pp. 263-
332). Again, in place of these developments, the Greens call for direct, 
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participatory democracy which would free itself from the present 
structures and party system. 
Thirdly, the issue of German identity emerged again as a national 
question. If the national status of divided Germany was a taboo after the 
defeat of Nazi nationalism, the question of national identity is now an 
accepted topic which pervades both the ncoconservative nostalgia for a 
rebirth of national spirit and some leftists' concern with reunification and 
national sovereignty (e.g., Horst Ehmke, "What Is the German's 
Fatherland? pp. 309-32; and Dieter Wellershoff, "Germany—A State of 
Flux," pp. 335-68). 
Fourthly, the book should be of special interest to the American 
reader insofar as the essays move beyond the German Zeitgeist and take 
up some universal problems pertaining to our present epoch. Among 
these would count, in the first place, the status of human and social 
sciences and the role humanities and liberal arts play in shaping meaning, 
conscience and values in Western culture (the section "Perspectives on 
the Geisteswissenschaften" includes an essay on theology by Jurgen 
Moltman, on literary criticism by Peter Burger, and on historiography by 
Hans-Ulrich Wehler, pp. 181-259; the section, "Perspectives on Culture 
and Religion" comprises an essay by Karl Heinz Bohrer on 'The Three 
Cultures," pp. 125-55). In the second place, three contributors address the 
relationship among religion, theology and social criticism (Dorothce 
Sollee, 'Thou Shalt Have No Other Jeans before Me" pp. 157-68, Johann 
Baptist Metz, "Productive Noncontemporaneity," pp. 169-77; and Jurgen 
Moltman, "Theology in Germany Today," pp. 181-205). 
In the third place, all commentaries on the German intellectual and 
political situation after the 1960s shed light on the contemporary debate 
between critical theory (Habermas) and postmodernism (Nietzsche, 
Bataille, Derrida, Foucault, Rorty) that nowadays cuts across the 
traditional divison between Continental and Anglo-American philosophy 
(especially Peter Burger, "Literary Criticism in Germany Today," pp. 207-
20). Like the 1979 broadcast in West Germany of the television film 
Holocaust, so also recent events—the book by one of Heidegger's former 
students, Victor Farias, Heidegger and Nazism, revelations about Paul de 
Man's Nazi sympathies and the Kurt Waldheim phenomena in 
contemporary Austrian politics—seem to steer the debate on both sides of 
the Atlantic towards a more critical evaluation of the roots of post-
modernism in politics and philosophy. 
It was Habermas* intention to diagnose the post-modern leftist 
critique of reason and neoconservative analyses of political discontents as 
a dialectic of Enlightenment that is not only self-referentially inconsistent 
but also incapable of developing the cure for the pathologies of modernity. 
The present volume, in place of an argued explication, exemplifies 
Habermas' distinction between communicative reason and the 
colonization of the life-world by systems of instrumental rationality. This 
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distinction is the condition of possible cure of pathological modernity by 
modernity's own resources. The book facilitates insight into the current 
state of the debate with a scholarly background and provocative angle. 
Hans Blumenberg,Work on Myth, trans. Robert M. Wallace. The M.l.T. 
Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1985. xl + 685 pages. Reviewed by Roy Martinez, 
Spelman College. 
This massive book is a testimony to the erudition and fertility of a 
singular mind bent on understanding the meaning of myth and 
illustrating its therapeutic function in the human animal. Hans 
Blumenberg was born July 13, 1920, in Liibeck. Before retiring from the 
University of Mtinster in 1986, he taught philosophy in Kiel, Hamburg, 
Cessen, and Bochum. Although he has published extensively on a wide 
range of subjects, only a few of his writings have appeared in English. 
Robert M. Wallace deserves credit for his lucid and engaging translation 
into English of two other books by Blumenberg published by MIT Press: 
The Legitimacy of the Modern Age (1983) and The Genesis of the 
As stated earlier, the range of his publication suggests a man of broad 
intellectual culture. He has written on Bultmann's "theological logic," on 
the possibility of ethics today, on ancient philosophy in the patristic period, 
on Kant and the question of the "Grace of Cod," on Nicholas of Cusa, on 
Metaphorology, on the concepts of reality and the possibility of the novel, 
on the significance of rhetoric, on the origin of theory, and the list can go 
on. And this varied accomplishment comes out quite unequivocally and 
poignantly in Work on Myth. This book does not purport to be a 
systematic treatise with a single overarching argument. Instead the author 
proffers several theses, though he does not always show how they connect. 
The reader is therefore sometimes left unaided to provide whatever nexus 
or structural unity he assumes is present in Blumenberg's insights. 
Nevertheless it is significant that the book opens with a quotation 
from Kafka and closes with a question referring to a commentary on 
Kafka's examination of the Prometheus myth. This might suggest that 
whatever the ultimate thrust of Work on Myth, Blumenberg is intimating 
that he shares an intellectual affinity with the author of The Castle and 
"Metamorphosis." But it would be naive to assume that such affinity is 
primarily what Blumenberg means to disclose in so seminal and complex 
an undertaking. Rather, it would be wiser to infer that the fundamental 
inspiration of his philosophical thinking is partly Kafkan. And this 
becomes more evident in his attitude towards the Enlightenment. 
As suggested by the title, the book's main theme is myth, more 
specifically the role played by myth in human existence. The author 
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makes it clear that myth, besides being on equal footing with logic, is 
primary and indispensable in man's experience: 'The fundamental 
patterns of myths are simply so sharply defined, so valid, so binding, so 
gripping in every sense, that they convince us again and again and still 
present themselves as the most useful material for any search for how 
matters stand, on a basic level, with human existence" (p. 150). However, 
for reasons unexplained, Blumenberg confines his analysis of mythology 
to the Greeks, concentrating his liveliest efforts on the myth of 
Prometheus. Indeed, if there is any thread of continuity in the book, it is to 
be located in Blumcnberg's intense and unswerving focus on Prometheus, 
who remains the central figure of Work on Myth. The choice of 
Prometheus, however, is not arbitrary. In view of the fact that Blumenberg 
strenuously wrestles with the human condition as a purely philosophical 
problem, and given his restriction of mythology to the Greeks, he had no 
better option - if justice is to be done to his theme - than the myth of 
Prometheus. Accordingly, with captivating buoyancy he examines the 
various versions of this myth throughout the history of Europe: in Hesiod, 
Aeschylus, Plato, Apollodorus, Diodorus Siculus, Lactantius, Julian 
Apostata, Tertullian, Boccaccio, Herder, Heine, Goethe, Vico, all the way to 
Gide and Kafka. 
Although myths are human creations, neither their authorship nor 
their origin in time can be established. Embedded as they are in human 
experience, in that they emerge contemporaneously with man's efforts to 
come to terms with conditions and forces beyond his control, myths must 
be looked at as a device whose function is to mitigate the fears and terrors 
arising naturally from the unknown. Correlative to the unknown is anxiety 
(Angst), which is "intentionality of consciousness without an object" (p. 4). 
In assigning names to the utterly alien, which manifests itself as strange 
powers, man is enabled to deal rationally with them. This ability to explain, 
or give an account of, the conditions of his experience and the 
consequences of his acts significantly reduces the uncanniness of the 
world. In fact, it renders the world more familiar. It sheds light into the 
night of the unfathomable, introduces form and figure into the 
amorphousness of chaos, thereby bringing what was previously intractable 
- because alien and undefined - within conceptual reach. In this way "the 
world becomes 'friendlier.' It approaches what the man who listens to 
myth needs: to be at home in the world" (p. 113). Accordingly, for 
example, Poseidon, god of the sea and figure of uncanniness, "can delay 
Odysseus's return home, but cannot prevent it; that return is the 
successful assertion of the world's familiarity, in opposition to the 
embodiment of its uncanniness" (p. 119). Odysseus is surer of himself. 
However, this self-confidence can be illusory. For Poseidon is also the 
figure of "doubtful goodwill, of dangerous irritability" (p. 118). The 
familiarity that engenders this surcness of self reposes on Poseidon, that is, 
on uncertainty. "Poseidon is perhaps called earthshaker because the 
230 AUSLEGUNG 
earth was thought of as floating on the sea. Earthquakes have always been 
men's most extreme experiences of insecurity" (p. 109). The upshot is that 
myth covers up the terror, pretends that security has been attained, but all 
the while anxiety settles in the core of existence, snug like a bug in a rug. 
Another way of expressing this absence of repose of finality in existence is 
to say that "myths do not answer questions; they make things 
questionable" (p. 126). 
The fundamental problem in human existence is what Blumenberg 
calls the "absolutism of reality." It's full meaning comprises the absolute 
impossibility of rendering transparent to himself man's ontological 
terminus a quo and terminus ad quern. It is thus a limit concept. This limit 
is at the nerve of the anxiety which myth helps to allay. As the author puts, 
it, what this concept means is that "man came close to not having control 
of the conditions of his existence and, what is more important, believed 
that he simply lacked control of them" (p. 4). From the very beginning, 
then, myth has been with man. The human animal has always been 
working with it. This is the work "of myth. Without it man would probably 
suffocate under the sheer weight of this existential behemoth: the 
absolutism of reality. The work " o f myth thus lightens the burden of 
existing, and by the nature of the situation alone work "on" myth is bound 
to continue, assuming on its way a variety of forms. "There is no end of 
myth" (p. 633). In fact, "There is no modality of remembering myth other 
than that of work on it; but neither is there any success in this work other 
than that of exhibiting the ultimate possible way of dealing with the myth -
which runs the inescapable risk of being refuted, of being convicted of 
implying a still-unfulfilled claim by the appearance of yet another possible 
way" (p. 632). 
One such unhealthy attitude toward myth is that of the 
Enlightenment. The unbounded appreciation and glorification of ratio 
that characterized the eighteenth-century thinkers misled them about 
myth. Their faith in the ability of science to remove the ills and terrors 
besetting mankind, their substitution of the natural for the supernatural, 
their conviction that reason, if obedient to the natural law, can insure 
progress and the perfectibility of the human race, was one more variation 
of myth-making, though the philosophes thought that they were beyond 
myth. But their gravest error was to suppose that the darker side of 
existence can ever be eradicated. Their one-eyed reason was sorely 
defective. They saw myth as "the darkness out of which reason lighted its 
own way," to be replaced by science (p. 265). Their absolute faith in the 
rationality of science prevented them from understanding that "it can be 
rational not to be rational to the utmost extent" (p. 163). Had they 
understood this paradoxical situation, then they would have realized that 
man's effort to feci at home in the world is merely an expression of his 
essential alienation in it. What is more, such is the structure of existence 
that self-confidence and uncannincss arc indissolubly bound. 
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It is this theme of not-at-homcness, I hazard, that attracts 
Blumenberg to Kafka. Where the thinkers of the Enlightenment not only 
tried to attenuate but also hoped to do away with the rougher edges of 
reality, Kafka zooms in on them, accentuating their inevitability. It is 
within the ambit of reason to discern that it itself may be without ground. 
All too often, however, rationality is "too ready to engage in destruction 
when it fails to recognize the rationality of the things for which no rational 
foundation is given, and believes it can afford to get carried away by the 
process of establishing rational foundation" (p. 163). Blumenberg's faith in 
the powers of reason induces in him a sympathy for the Enlightenment. 
But unlike their narrow reason, his is a logos of comprehensive vision. In 
the heroes of Kafka the sense of alienation and frustration resulting from 
the perpetual receding of the objects of their yearning is acutely brought 
to the fore. The despair that accompanies this dismal state of things 
nevertheless requires a spiritual strength. Kafka's message suggests that 
in this fortitude lies man's salvation. And Blumenberg seems to agree with 
him. 
Finally we read on page 399: "Everything up to this point in this book 
has a gradient; all the lines converge on a hidden vital point at which the 
work expanded on myth could prove to be something that was not fruitless. 
It was not fruitless if it could feed into the totality of one life, could give it 
the contours of its self-comprehension, its self-formulation, indeed its self-
formation - and this in a life that is open for our access, without the 
merciful hiding places that we all demand for ourselves." This privileged 
personnage is Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. Since the central figure of 
the book is mythical Prometheus, and Cocthe publicly identified himself 
with this Greek Titan, Blumenberg saw fit to devote a lot of space to him: 
Almost two hundred pages deal with a psychological analysis of Goethe, 
and an examination of his relationship with his literary contemporaries. 
These are Moses Mendelssohn, Lessing, Jacobi, Friedrich Schlegel, 
Schiller, Schelling, et al. In addition there is a portrayal of Goethe's curious 
admiration for Napoleon, whom the former also considers as Promethean. 
Blumenberg gets very involved in this section of the book. He leaves 
no doubt in the reader's mind that Goethe literally dominated the literary 
world of his time. Both as a man and as a man of letters Goethe comes out 
as titanic as Prometheus himself. What is more, he was convinced -
though the conviction ebbed and flowed - that he himself was a god. 
According to Blumenberg this divine self-interpretation on the part of 
Goethe is corroborated by an "extraordinary saying" in Dichtung und 
Wahrheit Nemo contra deum nisi deus ipse (No one can stand against a 
god unless he is a god himself) (p. 524). Goethe saw himself and Napoleon 
as being especially endowed to deal appropriately with fate and nature 
because they themselves were constituted of the same elements as these. 
Incredible, this. 
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The wealth of ideas and insights in Work on Myth cannot be faithfully 
represented in this review. The book displays the author's imposing 
scholarship. He is equally at home in biblical interpretation and patristic 
theology, in Creek philosophy and literature, in critical and modern 
philosophy, not to mention the ease with which he grasps the underlying 
currents running through the thoughts of his contemporaries such as 
Cassirer, Bultmann, and Heidegger. His attitudes vary With the subjects 
he treats. Accordingly, there is grudging admiration for Anselm's rigorous 
intellect, an undisguised antipathy to St. Paul, an intellectual sympathy 
with Marcion, an ambivalent attitude toward Nietzsche, and an 
amazement at Goethe's open conceit. 
There is great merit in Work on Myth quite apart from the author's 
original contribution to the subject of myth and its therapeutic function in 
human existence. The vim with which Blumenberg presents his material 
reflects the dynamism of a resourceful mind that hopefully will give us 
more of the same. 
Narration and Knowledge, by Arthur C. Danto. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1985. pp. xvii + 399. Reviewed by Robert Switzer, 
Pennsylvania State University. 
This book is an interesting and significant contribution to the 
philosophy of history, both in its critical analysis of the limits of such 
philosophy, and its positive articulation of the nature of historical 
knowledge and narrative structure. It provides us with a new edition of 
Danto's early work, Analytical Philosophy of History (Cambridge 
University Press, 1965), and in addition three essays (from 1966-69) which 
reveal an increasing openness to the authors and issues of Continental 
philosophy. The original book, as Danto wrote in its Preface, involves "an 
analysis of historical thought and language, presented as a systematic 
network of arguments and clarifications, the conclusions of which 
compose a descriptive metaphysic of historical existence" (p.xv). These 
positive philosophical contributions are more fully articulated in the later 
essays. The last of these, "Narration and Knowledge," as Danto writes in 
his new (1985) Introduction, "moves beyond analytic philosophy to a kind 
to rapprochement with phenomenology, seeking to show the structures of 
philosophical consciousness as such" (p. xiii). And indeed, this work will 
reward careful study not only by philosophers of history, but also by those 
interested in philosophy of science and the broader questions of 
temporality and narrative structure. 
Despite the rare and commendable breadth of Danto's philosophical 
horizons, it remains the basic contention of even this newly enlarged work 
that the only viable philosophy of history is analytical - that indeed the 
alternative, what he terms "substantive" philosophy of history, is 
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impossible. What Danto means to outlaw are not historical accounts -
though necessary and related limits are uncovered here as well - but 
accounts of the whole of history which attempt to identify patterns among 
events and project them into the future, in terms of "ultimate meaning." 
Whether ultimate or not, historical meaning is understood by Danto as 
significance within a larger temporal whole; this notion is key to his 
analysis of the narrative structures of historical accounts generally, and to 
his amendments to the Covering Law Model, classically stated by Hempcl, 
which sought to subsume history into a Nco-Positivistic conception of 
science. 
Before turning in depth to these issues, Danto devotes chapters II- VI 
to deftly argued considerations of the various forms of historical 
skepticism - specifically, those attacking historical knowledge on the basis 
of the meaning, the reference, or the truth-values of historical statements. 
In each case, the issues - the pragmatism and verificationalism of C. I. 
Lewis and A. J. Aycr, Russell's famous question, "How can it be proved that 
the world did not come into existence, complete with historical and 
geological relics, a few minutes ago?" and historical relativism - are 
explored in detail. Danto manages cither to refute the skeptical position, 
or to show that it has no special bearing on history per se. In terms of the 
perennial question of relativism, for example, Danto grants that here is no 
such thing as "pure" description, that the historian's preconceptions and 
schemes of organization will determine the set of possible historical 
accounts and so distort "history-as-actuality," but argues, contra Beard, 
that this is not a failing of history vis-a-vis the sciences, but a mark of the 
latter as well. The detailed analyses in these chapters of structures such as 
tensed sentences, past-referring predicates and topical motivating 
interests, are crucial in furthering the over-all argument of the book. 
This argument, as I have indicated, hinges on Danto's account of 
narration as the basic organizing scheme of history (chs. VII, VIII and XI). 
On this view, description, interpretation and explanation radically 
interpenetrate each other - "history is all of a piece" (p. 115). A complete, 
adequate and "impartial" record of events is not merely unattainable in 
practice; logically, Danto argues, it would not be history at all. One can 
imagine an Ideal Chronicler, a being with present-tense omniscience who 
can record everything that happens as it happens; Danto's insight is that 
the uselessness of this plethora of data would result primarily from a lack 
of selection and organization into patterns of salience, resting in turn on 
the unavailability to this Chronicler of narrative sentences. The essence of 
these sentences, as defined by Danto, is to give descriptions of an event 
under which that event could not have been witnessed - that is, specifically, 
by making reference to later events known to the narrator (historian), for 
whom they are past, but unknowable to an eye-witness, for whom they are 
future. The statements, 'The Thirty Years War began in 1618," and Piero 
da Vinci begat a universal genius," could not have been known true at the 
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known true at the time of the events they describe. Since, Danto argues, "it 
is only in the future that the events he witnesses will take on a measure of 
significance," (p. 159), the Ideal Chronicler - as indeed anyone - must be 
denied the possibility of historical awareness of the present. Thus 
"Methodological Individualism," the last chapter of the original book, 
concludes, after a reference to the owl of Minerva, with the following 
words: 
Philosophies of History attempt to capture the future without realizing 
that if we knew the future, we would control the present, and so falsify 
statements about the future, and so such discoveries would be 
useless. We capture the future only when it is too late to do anything 
about the relevant present, for it is then past and beyond our control. 
We can but find out what its significance was, and this is the work of 
historians: history is made by them. (p. 284) 
Having argued that historians create history out of the past through 
the organizing instrument of narrative structure, Danto next considers 
whether they also explain it (chs. X-Xl). His claim in chapter VII was that 
in history, narration is explanation - that the selection and organization 
involved in telling what happened will also tend to explain why it happened 
(p. 130). He develops this further by suggesting that what is explained in 
narrative - with its "beginning, middle and end" structure - is not merely an 
event, but a change in a subsisting subject. Danto's model is the following: 
(1) x i s f a t M . 
(2) H happens to x at t-2. 
(3) x is G at i-3. 
where (2) explains (l)-(3) (cf. p. 236). Danto's irenic response to the 
controversy surrounding the application of the Covering Law Model to 
history was this: Even though the change may not be covered by a general 
law under all descriptions, it can be rcdescribed in such a way that H can 
be selected as causing changes of the "type" Fx-Gx, in the light of some 
general, though probably implicit, law (pp. 220-26, 238). The move from a 
concrete to a general description becomes of course the crucial step; 
Danto likens it to a re-gcstalting; (p. 221) and admits that the rules for this 
are "perhaps difficult to specify" (p. 227). Finally, in the case of history, 
general laws normally cover an open and nonhomogenous class of 
instances, such that we can predict a plausible range of occurrences, but 
not the precise event (pp. 224-26). 
A committed Hempelian, at least, would by this point have lost all 
patience with Danto's efforts to mediate the dispute, Danto having 
violated this view's basic tenet of predictability: that any explanation of X 
must ground the belief that X did in fact occur. In the last two decades, 
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however, Hempel's efforts to subordinate history to science have lost their 
currency; after Hanson and Kuhn, Danto writes in his new Introduction, it 
was rather that "all of science was brought under history," becoming 
"matter for the kinds of interpretation that earlier theorists had identified 
as the methodological prerogative of the human sciences: ways of reading 
the world" (p. xi). While Danto's original position did stress the autonomy 
of narrative history from science, now he would express himself more 
forcefully: "it is unlikely," he writes, "that an event can be covered by a law 
under the same description in which it is covered by an historical 
narrative" (p. xii). 
Danto's positions are not without their difficulties; I can briefly touch 
on two here. History is compared to a story; this is, 1 think, a peculiarly apt 
analogy, and indeed one which Danto might have been more happily 
guided by than he was. For there is more to a story than narrative - and 
more to history as well; characters, attitudes, and ideologies and other 
contextual forces shape events without themselves being events. 
Secondly, while the significance of events in a story may become finally 
and definitively clear only when the story is over, it does not follow that an 
intelligent reader must be utterly incapable of perceiving any shadow of 
this significance in the midst of a first reading. 
To the first point, Danto seems to suggest that context is generally 
implicit in narrative (cf. p. 141); my suggestion in the second is that 
narrative is similarly implicit in context - that the present can acquire 
significance in terms of what might be termed a "narrative fore-structure" 
which selectively organizes experience in terms of projection into the 
future as well as appropriation of the past. "Substantive" philosophy of 
history can offer us no certain or absolute perspective on the present as 
historical - but neither is history of the past ever final, as Danto shows, 
since it is always possible that the new events in the future will suggest 
reassessment. Danto's insistence on isolating the beginning, middle and 
end of historical narratives would seem to demand a perspective 
unavailable to us; history and philosophy of history are efforts to 
understand a story that is still going on, and which inescapably we are in. 
My suggestion, however, is that we can have a sense of the direction of 
an unfolding story, and events can have foreshadowings of meaning. It is 
true of course that we are often wrong - mystery writers excel in tripping 
up our expectations. But this is possible only because we have 
expectations; we have read similar tales before, and have developed an 
ear for their rhythms. In one of the three marvelously rich later essays 
which complete this new edition, in the midst of proscribing the limits of 
verstehen or "sympathetic understanding" in history, Danto writes that 
"The quality of a period would be unknown to those who lived in it if it were 
the only form of life they knew" (p. 269). Thus the relevance of history to 
our understanding of the present: "We are, through contrasts with 
predecessors and contemporaries, alive to much concerning our period." 
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But, he adds, "much remains hidden and will be revealed only through 
contrasts we cannot draw, with periods later than our own" (p. 297). This is, 
I think, most fair, and seems to support the view that the possibility and 
limits of "substantive" philosophy of history - understood not as prediction 
of the future, but as an effort to be as alive as possible to the quality and 
direction of the story we are living, and to the horizon of history as the 
domain of our humanity - remain questions worthy of further attention. 
Overall, Danto's contributions to the philosophy of history have been 
outstanding, and we are fortunate indeed to have this new edition of this 
work. This volume does not end the debates it both describes and enters; 
nor does it make reference to those that have occurred in the literature in 
the last twenty years or so. But while the Covering Law Model, for 
example, has lost much of its lustre even in the sciences, most of the 
clarifications and insights of this work have retained their value and 
philosophical pertinence. Danto's insistence on the autonomy of history 
and his analysis of narrative structure have been most influential. Indeed, 
it is wholly consistent with Danto's position that the real significance of this 
book has come to stand out more and more clearly with the passage of 
time. 
Phenomenology—Metaphysics or Method?, by Gerhard Funke. 
Trans. David J. Parent, with a foreward by Thomas M. Seebohm. Athens: 
Ohio University Press, 1987; pp. iv + 264. Reviewed by C. S. Schreiner, 
Pennsylvania State University. 
For its most disciplined practitioners phenomenology would always 
remain—to echo Jean Wahl describing the Cartesian Meditations in a 
letter to Wallace Stevens—an "approach to the unapproachable" in which 
"an inexhaustible infinity of a priori" would be interrogated with an 
unusual extravagance of rigor. Such an "approach" would inspire and 
provoke a list of writers/ thinkers too familiar to the readers of Auslegung 
to be repeated here. No less influential in its full import would be 
Husserl's elaboration of Brentano's theory of intentionality. Experience, as 
subjective exteroception in a field of horizons, an impetus of Sinngebung 
(sense-bestowal) and construal, was portrayed as other-directed, as 
already somewhere and something else. Husserl's contributions will 
probably endure not only because the articulation of their blind spots 
ushered in a new era in theory, during which Husserl became a whipping-
post for anti-subjectivist critiques; his contributions will also remain with us 
as, in toto, an insomnia of pursuit which insisted on tracking down and 
releasing ensnared infinities, on catching sight of the spread of 
Vorzeichnung (predclincation) and of concatenations of temporal and 
corporeal phenomena which comprise the taken for granted intentional 
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manifold of everyday life. Husserl's work has accurately been 
characterized for its rigor of infinitum, for its inexorable tendency to 
infinitizc itself, its own tasks, as well as the elements of the ordinary. 
Such Husserlian rigor is by no means absent from Gerhard Funke's 
recently translated Phenomenologie—Metaphysik oder Melhode?, first 
published in 1966. Funke's book, briskly written albeit devoid of live detail 
or demonstration, is a "manifesto" (Seebohm's term) representing a 
German branch of phenomenology which refuses to totalize Husserl's 
work as a mere preparatory step within the tradition which had cultivated 
existence philosophy, ontology, and hermeneutics. Whether through 
argument or hegemony, Funke presses transcendental phenomenology 
into service to cover all of these bases. Today's readers, coming to Husserl 
by way of avant-garde critiques, rarely feel the same rush of deliverance 
when reading him that Sartre did in the 1930's. Funke's text does 
reanimate the ambition of Husserl's project, and his interpretation of 
phenomenology deserves to be carefully read by Anglo-American 
philosophers and critics. The footnotes alone, comprising almost half the 
book (the main text ends on p. 177), provide English-speaking readers with 
a full report of post-war German research in phenomenology. 
Reading Funke we are witnesses to a severe watchmanship, an 
insomnia that also permeated Husserl's pages. This insomnia, a mistrust 
of the given, tries to prevent the given from slipping through the gates of 
consciousness to establish a hidden dominion of dogma. The guiding 
principles of Funke's inquiry, which also quicken his own Kantian rigor, are 
Husserl's epoche and the Ruckfrage, the questioning back from 
something given to the "constitutive conditions of possibility" (p. 26) and 
"presuppositions under which something comes to appearance as 
something" (p. 97). An ideology of presence and phonocentrism would, 
according to Derrida, manage to infiltrate Husserl's theory and remain an 
invisible given which would prevent it from releasing one of the few 
infinities it didn't fully encounter-the play of difference which precedes 
intuition and defers recuperation. This Derridean finding does not inform 
Funk's treatise. Funke will insist on a "transcendental" phenomenology; 
yet his rigor is such that he thoroughly interrogates many of the 
metaphysical givens that are traditional components of transcendental 
theories. He insists that phenomenology "must not go over to the 
proclamation of metaphysical-speculative doctrines" (p. 90). Funke's 
critical phenomenology will continually dissolve the self-possession of self-
validating modes of authority, objective inquiry, dogmas, cultural units. 
The "transcendence" which appears here is the exposed correlation nexus 
in the circle of understanding, the "grounding connections which are 
secretly at work in each case" (p. 91); and "authority" for Funke will "always 
let itself by known only in and with its connections of grasping from which 
and in which it understands itself (p. 108). Thus the Kantian thing-in-itself 
cannot be accepted as numinous by Funke's program, since the thing-in-
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itself cannot but reside as a correlation in the phenomenal field, the circle 
of understanding; nor will any of its modern clones such as, Funke says, a 
Heideggerian "Being-in-itself" presiding over an ontic-ontological 
difference (p. 116). We must be wary, Funke insists, of the doctrines of 
"awestruck esoterics" (p. 91). Even disruptions of intentionality such as 
anxiety or the "impossible inclusion" of the alterity portrayed by Levinas 
(Funke only mentions Heideggerian Angst) can only be accounted for, 
described or intimated, from the perspective of someone's consciousness. 
This insomniacal phenomenology must turn on itself; it tries to show 
that it has learned about itself from the problematics that afflicted the 
Husserlian program, especially its last phase. The Lebenswelt will not be 
used, as so many other philosophers have used it, to curtail the fury of the 
epoche and launch into a taxonomy of psychophysical beings in their 
"natural" habitat. The Lebenswelt is not for Funke the metaphysical 
"ground of origin" (p. 103), but another unity of sense, a field of operation 
which is a correlate of a specific temporality and set of presuppositions. 
The Lebenswelt will show from its appearances, like other phenomena 
swelling into the present, its constitutive conditions as a product of an 
historical ensemble of performances of consciousness. What Funke 
ceaselessly tries to avoid is valorizing any philosophical discovery as a 
"utopian" concept or resting place. The Lebenswelt cannot be a Utopia for 
a critical philosophy; neither can Heidegger's "four-fold" or "clearing," or 
Scheler's "person" or "value." There can be no authoritative nowhere 
(utopia) since everything has its place in time. Such an assertion leads 
Funke to an interesting notion of "topicality" which strikes us as singularly 
postmodern. To acknowledge ongoing temporalization is to forfeit 
profundity or reification. "Genuine science," Funke says of his 
phenomenology, "knows know profundity" (p. 70). The fixity of the 
Ruckfrage in Husserl's thought, then, must also be unbound in order for 
the exigency of the future to assert itself in the onrush of the present. The 
crisis of reason, itself now already making different demands on historical 
protagonists, cannot be resolved merely through a recovery of some 
earlier, "primal" thinking or landscape. Heidegger is no less culpable for 
buying into the "fallacy of the earlier" (p. 126). 
Certainly Funke's phenomenology makes a more explicit use of 
hermeneutical axioms than Husserl's. "It is never possible," he says, "to 
overleap interpretation as interpretation" (p. 27). Funke will not uphold 
Husserl's semantic idealism or theory of essences; yet a notion of 
transcendental inquiry remains the backbone of Funke's phenomenology. 
Funke's "method" is the insomnia of a transcendental inquiry which , in its 
investigation of the constitutive activity which bestows sense and claims 
certainty, is more "objective" than sciences which don't recognize that their 
truth is a certain ontic sense-formation and one point of view among 
others. The "origin" to which sense connections lead back, and which 
phenomeonolgy describes, is not egoity or absolute presence, but Leistung 
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(performance or production). To be more precise, said origin is the 
complicity of Leistung and coming-to-appearance; this is where the "ontic" 
is instituted (p. 157). 
Readers of Funke's manifesto cannot overlook the existential grain of 
a program so empowered by its own operative concepts. A philosophy can 
never by its mistrust of the given, that also affirms the concrete historicity 
of its own operative concepts, speak of "the" Lebenswell unless it 
disregards the situational interests and antagonisms of an intended 
existent which make possible a concrete variation of an Lebenswelt. 
Phenomenology will never, if it is to remain a critical philosophy, take this 
disregard for granted. Funke emphasizes that phenomenology will not 
market its own convictions or facts, but only expose the "doxic-topical" 
composition of naive disciplines that dogmatically uphold convictions and 
facts to the exclusion of all others. But every method or philosophical 
approach will finally have a binding power, will make an appeal to those 
who would uphold it or refuse it. At the site of the Leistung and phansis 
(coming-to-appearance) complicity is bound in a certain direction; 
relevance determines this direction, perhaps, and perhaps also an 
imperative. If this imperative issues from the demands of a pregiven 
concept of reason, a very particular realm of sense is instituted. As Funke 
warns, "For reason, only what should be, can be" (p. 159). Here Funke 
treads difficult turf, for he doesn't want to come across as another Kant or 
Husserl, but he also refuses to betray them. What is most important for 
him, it turns out, is what concerned Heidegger: the task of protecting the 
opening, the free site for the possibility of appearances to show themselves 
in a variety of ways. But Funke will address this issue by speaking of 
"transcendental subjectify", unlike Heidegger. 'Transcendental subjectity, 
which, let it be said in conclusion, we ourselves functionally are, does not 
represent a 'pregiveness of a higher kind,' but can be characterized only as 
the constitutive freedom of the origin." And in the next sentence Funke 
turns about and, again unlike Heidegger, calls in reason. "Genuine origin, 
however, must probably be reason with its evidences, on which everything 
depends" (p. 159). The question remains: is this last utterance prescriptive 
or descriptive, and what does the answer to this question have to do with 
the already impossible task of construing phenomenology as either 
method or a metaphysics? 
Every method makes an appeal, never stands valueless but harbors a 
protreptic and promises a specific future. Husserl's method was an urgent 
call to recuperate the contact between man and world, reason and 
existence. Is Funke's insomnia thirty years later only the vigilance of 
Western reason excluding all else (narrative, "play," the poetic) that 
appears? Probably not; but readers may ask how Funke's project would 
respond to Heidegger's analysis of the Gestell (enframing), or to Lyotard's 
view that telematic information is, in its global hegemony, obviating 
narrative or converting it into programming languages. The questioning 
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always returns, as Funke well knows, to the opening, what method protects 
it, what opening to protect: what-ought-to-be. 
Kirk F. Koerner, Liberalism and Its Critics, New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1985. hardcover, pp. 396 Reviewed by David C. Snyder, Calvin 
College. 
The political ideology of liberalism is coming under increasing attack 
these days even though it shows no signs of losing its status as the 
dominant picture of social life. Nevertheless, criticisms from both the left 
and the right continue to mount. In this book Koerner defends liberalism 
against four critics: C. D. Macphcrson, Herbert Marcuse, Leo Strauss and 
Michael Oakeshott. In each case he complains that the critics, whether 
from the right or the left, misunderstand liberalism and its origins. 
However, although the book is well researched, I found its argument 
unconvincing. 
First, two minor points. The text is not type set but was produced from 
typescript provided by the author. While this practice is becoming 
increasingly common, the mediocre print quality of this book does prove 
irritating after a while. At least Koerner could have used a computer to 
produce a nicer camera ready copy. Also, I wonder why Strauss was 
chosen as one of the two conservative critics of liberalism. Most of Strauss' 
work was done in the 1950's, and although Straussian analysis of American 
culture is making a comeback with the popularity of Bloom's The Closing 
of the American Mind, nevertheless Strauss himself is a rather easy target. 
His work has been heavily criticized by lots of folks, and popularizers like 
Bloom, despite his public acclaim, seem not to care for such niceties as 
sound arguments. I would have preferred that Koerner take on more 
important critics of liberalism such as, say, Alasdair Maclntyre. 
Now to more significant problems. First, Koerner never gives any 
clear explanation of what he takes liberalism to be or the version he wants 
to defend. There are several different strands of liberal ideology, from the 
classical liberalism of Mill and Adam Smith, to the contemporary reform 
liberalism of Rawls, and to the libertarian liberalism of Nozick. Which of 
these does Koerner find attractive? The reader is left to guess. It's true 
that in the last chapter Koerner mentions the distinction between classical 
and reform liberalism, but he says nothing about the basis for the 
distinction. 
Furthermore, when Koerner does describe liberalism he uses only 
very general and vague language. Liberalism, he tells, us, "begins and 
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ends with the ideals of individual human freedom, individual human 
rights and individual human happiness." (p. 322). In addition, liberalism's 
present significance derives from a "commitment to individual liberty and 
individual self-determination" (p. 309). Once again, "liberal ideals and 
aspirations. . . arc governed by the quest for freedom and equality, or in 
other words, for universal personal autonomy" (p. 3). Unfortunately, these 
three pleasant-sounding passages do not tell us very much about the view 
that Koerner wants to defend. 
Historically, liberalism is characterized by two dominant features. 
First, liberal ideology is committed to the idea that the state ought to be 
neutral between competing conceptions of the good. That is, the state 
ought to provide the arena in which each of us is free to pursue our own 
vision of the good as long as we don't harm others in the process. So if one 
person seeks to maximize his pleasure, another seeks to achieve lasting 
recognition, and another tries to please God, the liberal says that the state 
should only provide an arena in which each of us pursues our own good. 
Both classical and reform liberals remain committed to this myth. At least 
I see it as a myth. But Koerner never mentions it. 
The second element of all forms of liberalism is a commitment to the 
marketplace as the central component of society. What I mean is, 
whatever their differences, liberals all agree that the market functions as 
the key to a free society. Now of course they disagree on how the market 
should work. Classical liberals think it should be essentially unregulated, 
where reform liberals think it should be far more regulated. But they all 
agree on its importance to a free society. 
But on many other points liberals disagree with each other. Which 
version of liberalism is Koerner defending? He fails even to describe what 
liberalism is, let alone distinguish different types. Thus the reader is left 
wondering just what Koerner wants to defend. 
Another significant problem I found is that at times Koerner's 
arguments are simply implausible. I will consider just one example. 
Against Macpherson's Marxist criticism of the development of 
liberalism, Koerner's strategy is simple. For each of the alleged liberals 
that Macpherson attacks, Koerner tries to show either that the view in 
question is not an example of liberalism (or more accurately, the parts of 
the view that Macpherson doesn't like aren't truly liberal), or if the view is 
liberal, that Macpherson's criticisms are wrong. This strategy leads 
Koerner to do considerable historical work with Hobbes, Locke and so on, 
with two resulting problems. 
First, at times Koerner seem to be unfamiliar with current historical 
scholarship. Concerning Locke, for example, the picture of him as a 
classic liberal is quite dated, and few current Locke scholars would call 
Locke a liberal. Indeed, according to Richard Ashcraft, reading Locke as a 
Calvinist revolutionary is the new orthodoxy in Locke scholarship. 
Macpherson can't be faulted here, of course, since his The Political Theory 
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of Possessive Individualism was published in 1962. But Koerner seems to 
agree with Macpherson that Locke is a liberal and to disagree only on the 
particulars of Macpherson's reading of Locke. The result is that for 
contemporary readers most of Kocrner's argument is simply beside the 
point. 
Even at that, sometimes Koerner's analysis just misses the force of 
Macpherson's argument. To Macpherson's complaint that Locke justifies 
unlimited acquisition, Koerner says that Locke was only describing what 
he saw going on around him, and one can hardly fault Locke for that. But 
Macpherson's claim is that Locke justified acquisition as morally 
legitimate. Indeed, Macpherson's point is that the justification of 
acquisition is the goal of Locke's political theory. Now I think Macpherson 
is dead wrong about that, but Koerner's objection misses the point 
altogether. 
I think Koerner's claim that Hobbes isn't a liberal, as Macpherson 
thinks he is, is right, but Koerner should have considered the abundant 
evidence gathered by current scholars that questions Locke's alleged 
liberalism as well. 
Second, too often Koerner just accepts others' criticisms of 
Macpherson without doing much work himself with Locke's texts. In many 
places we get a mere summary of others' work. 
1 won't say anything about Koerner's treatment of Marcuse, Strauss 
and Oakeshott, except that I found similar problems with each. A 
discerning reader will find more able defenses of liberalism elsewhere. 
